We present the first estimates of the investment returns and distribution rates for U.S. non-profit endowment funds, based on a comprehensive sample of more than 24,000 organizations drawn from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filings between 2010-15. Very small endowments earn risk-adjusted returns above market benchmarks, but larger ones significantly underperform, with an inverse relation between fund size and abnormal returns. Higher education endowments, the majority of the $0.5 trillion asset class, do significantly worse than funds in other sectors. Endowments earn better returns when their parent organizations are located near financial centers. Distribution ratios are conservative, well below the funds' long-run actual and expected returns. Donors increase their contributions when endowment returns exceed market benchmarks, with an elasticity of about 0.129 between investment returns and new donations.
belie those touted in commercial surveys that have made their way into the press and academic papers.
Overall the funds in our study earn negative abnormal returns except in the case of very small endowments, those with assets of less than $1 million. These results are largely in agreement with those for other investor classes, which typically exhibit zero or negative alphas.
See, e.g., the well known research into mutual funds by Fama and French (2010) , individual investors by Barber and Odean (2000) , hedge funds by Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) , and private equity by Franzoni, Nowak, and Phalippou (2012) , among many other performance measurement studies.
We study the distribution policies of non-profit endowments to their parent organizations, which resemble the dividend policies that are an important research topic in corporate finance.
We find that most endowments have conservative distribution policies that imply payouts below their long-run expected returns, and well below the actual returns realized during the sample period for our study. These cautious distribution policies would tend to cause endowments to grow without limit over time. The smallest endowment funds make no payouts at all in most cases, implying that organizations seek to grow them to a critical mass before using them as a permanent funding source.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a description of the dataset. Section III analyzes endowment funds' investment returns, and Section IV analyzes their distribution policies. Section V studies whether donations to the parent organization respond positively to good investment returns in the endowment. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Data description
Our data comes from Form 990, a document filed annually with the IRS by most nonprofit firms in the U.S. Since 2008, Part V of Schedule D for Form 990 has required those organizations with endowment funds to provide annual data including the fund balance at the beginning of the year, contributions, distributions, administrative expenses, and net investment earnings. These data are a matter of public record, but obtaining them for a large sample of organizations has been impractical up to now, because online databases of information from Form 990 filings have all omitted coverage of this schedule.
We use Form 990 data that has been posted by the IRS since 2016 on Amazon Web Services (AWS) as a result of a lawsuit filed by Carl Malamud, an advocate for transparency in the nonprofit sector. 3 The website hosts annual schema of all electronic Form 990 filings beginning in 2011. The electronic filing requirements, which have been phased in gradually since 2006, today cover all but the smallest public charities. We believe our sample, especially in the most recent years, covers substantially all of the endowment assets in the United States, since smaller organizations are far less likely than large ones to maintain endowments. Table 1 presents a tabulation of the observations in our sample. The available data on the AWS website has well over 1 million organization-year observations beginning in 2010, but most of these charities are too small to have permanent endowments. For purposes of reporting our results in calendar time, we assign each filing to the calendar year that includes the final month of its chosen fiscal year. 4 We retain observations for a subsample of 79,224 Form 990
filings that include non-missing data for start-of-year and end-of-year endowment balances as well as investment earnings during the year. We exclude a small number of observations that exhibit data inconsistencies or have irregular tax years of fewer than 360 or more than 370 days. representing only a small minority of the observations, account for well over half of all nonprofit endowment assets.
Our analysis focuses on the rates of return earned by endowment funds. As reported to the IRS, investment returns are based on dividends, interest, and capital appreciation of the fund's assets rather than only realized gains. An organization can either include its expenses as part of a report of "net investment earnings" on Line 1c of this schedule, or it can report gross investment earnings on Line 1c while listing administrative expenses separately on Line 1f. For the minority of organizations that follow the latter practice, we calculate net investment earnings by subtracting any value reported on Line 1f from Line 1c. We then calculate the annual investment return by taking the ratio of net investment earnings over the sum of start-of-year assets plus one-half of contributions. Contributions are generally bequests, gifts, and other funds deposited into endowments, and our calculation implicitly assumes that the typical contribution is received halfway through the fiscal year and that any distributions from the fund do not occur until year-end.
5 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. The typical endowment size is quite small, with a mean of $30.3 million and median of $1.5 million, but the largest funds run into the tens of billions, with a maximum value of $31.6 billion (Harvard University, 2014).
Outside education, the largest fund is the $7.3 billion endowment of the Shriners Hospitals for Children (as of 2014). The median annual investment return, calculated according to our method, is 7.21%, and the median distribution ratio is much lower, 2.42%.
III. Investment returns

A. Full-sample results, and size-based sub-samples
The main results of our study appear in Table 3 , which presents regression estimates for abnormal net investment returns using the standard four-factor model, with the benchmark risk factors aligned in calendar time with each observation. We show estimates for the entire sample in the first column, and for four subsamples partitioned according to the endowments' start-ofyear asset values. All standard errors are clustered at the organization level.
In the first column of the table, the estimates for the intercept or alpha show a positive abnormal return of 9 basis points per year that is not statistically significant, implying that, on average, endowments' earnings approximately equal their four-factor expected returns. The 5 This assumption probably makes our estimate of returns slightly conservative. Distributions from endowments can occur at any time during the year. Inflows to endowments typically happen when an organization receives bequests or has a capital campaign to solicit donations from its constituents. Donations tend to cluster in the month of December for tax-timing reasons, and since many organizations have a June 30 fiscal year-end, our assumption would seem neutral. For the sizeable cohort of organizations with fiscal years ending December 31, the assumption is conservative. Bequests occur stochastically, so assuming they arrive halfway through a fiscal year is probably neutral for our estimates. (Merton, 1993) .
Although the estimates for the overall sample imply that endowment returns generally match the market, this interpretation is misleading because it relies on data from a very large number of observations for tiny endowments that represent only a minor part of the overall asset category. This is evident from data tabulated at the bottom of Table 3 . The very smallest endowments, those with asset values below $1 million which we label as "tiny," comprise 43.1% of the observations in the sample but account for only 0.4% of the assets invested. At the other extreme, the "large" cohort of endowments, those worth more than $100 million, account for 3.9% of the observations and 77.8% of the assets. As shown by the intercepts in each column, the large endowments significantly underperform their benchmarks while the tiny endowments are the only category to outperform.
The inverse relation we find between endowment size and performance echoes the pattern found for mutual funds in several studies. This pattern is regarded as something of a puzzle, since larger funds should enjoy advantages in trading costs and access to research and other information. Chen et al (2004) proposes a range of explanations for the pattern, including the costs of investing in illiquid securities, which are more commonly held by larger funds, and the administrative costs of team management that is often used by larger funds. Pollet and Wilson (2008) discuss the costs of diversification and fund family membership as possible explanations, but neither of these issues would seem relevant for endowments, which are typically the only funds overseen by their parent organizations. The liquidity explanation is possibly the most sensible, as some non-profit endowments are known to be over-weighted in individual securities donated by university alumni or other benefactors who found their own companies and contribute a slice of the equity to their favorite charities. 6 The costs of hedging and eventually unwinding these block ownership positions may create a drag on the overall returns for the fund.
B. Returns and proximity to financial centers
We study the access to investment advice in analysis presented in Table 4 . The first column reproduces the baseline four-factor estimates for the entire sample from Table 3 Francisco. For the latter three, we use the headquarters addresses of Fidelity Investments, Northern Trust, and Charles Schwab, respectively. A similar pattern emerges with a negative and significant estimate.
We are not aware of any result in the investments literature consistent with the idea that access to professional investment advice leads to superior performance; indeed, much of the research on the underperformance of professional managers and the virtues of passive indexed investing suggests quite the opposite. 7 Our results may be consistent with a number of potential explanations other than access to professional investment advice. For instance, non-profits near financial centers are probably much more likely to have better-informed board members, and they may establish superior investment policies for these organizations' endowments.
C. College and university endowments
Because colleges and universities represent such an important subgroup of the universe of non-profit endowments, we analyze their returns separately and display the results in Table 5 .
The estimates are striking: higher education institutions, whose endowments account for more than half of all assets in the sample despite representing just 6% of the observations, significantly underperform market benchmarks, with abnormal investment returns of minus 140 basis points per year. All other endowment funds earn positive alphas, with a statistically significant estimate of 16 basis points per year. We confirm that this result is not size-driven by looking separately at the four size-based subsamples from Table 3 ; we find that colleges and universities underperform other sectors in all four size cohorts, although the difference is statistically significant only in the large and medium sized sectors. These two size cohorts, however, account for virtually all the capital invested in endowment funds by colleges and universities, with 92.5%
and 7.1% of the overall assets in that sector, respectively.
Prior research such as Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008) has found that the self-reported returns for universities in the NACUBO sample tend to track the academic quality of the institutions, with more selective schools earning higher investment returns. We find some evidence consistent with this in the right column of Table 5 , which looks at the abnormal returns earned by endowments of the top 20 national universities (the Ivy League schools and others such as MIT, Stanford, and Georgetown) as ranked by U.S. News and World Report. These schools do earn mildly positive but not statistically significant abnormal returns. While these results are not in line with earlier studies and copious media coverage about the out-performance of elite schools, they suggest that these schools do better than others within their sector and basically earn returns that are no worse than average. However, they also support the conclusion that the investment wisdom of top universities is largely a myth, as one would expect to earn these types of returns simply by chance. Frequent mentions in the media of the out-performance of top schools seems likely due to the outsized success of just one university, Yale.
IV. Distribution policy
Endowments exist to distribute funds to their parent organizations. In principle, these distributions could fund part of an organization's operating budget, or be used for non-recurring capital expenditures, or could occur as needed to close deficits when an organization cannot otherwise balance its budget. Little is known about the distribution policies for non-profit endowments other than two recent small-sample studies by Brown et. al (2014) and Yermack by Lintner (1956) . The tenor of these policies implies that non-profits aim for a stable distribution rate from their endowments, with the rate equal to the long-run expected return of the fund. However, other papers have taken issue with this type of distribution policy, such as Hansmann (1990) and Merton (1993) . Hansmann focuses on issues of intergenerational equity and concludes that an overly conservative distribution policy may give undue benefit to affluent future generations. Merton notes that an endowment fund can be invested, and can follow distribution policies, that hedge an organization's cash flows from other assets, such as a university's streams of tuition revenue and donations. Table 6 shows descriptive statistics about the distribution policies for the endowment funds in our sample. We calculate the distribution rate based on information in Part V, Schedule D of Form 990. The distribution rate is calculated as the ratio of distributions for grants and scholarships (Line 1d) plus distributions for facilities and programs (Line 1e) over the sum of beginning-of-year assets (Line 1a) plus 50% of new contributions and transfers during the year (Line 1b). It should be thought of as similar to the dividend policy for a company deciding what fraction of its equity to pay out to shareholders each year. We present data for the sample overall in the left column of Table 6 and for each of the four size cohorts in the next four columns.
The data indicate that endowments have a mean distribution rate of 5.74% and a median rate of 2.42%, with more than one-third of funds not making any distribution at all. However, these statistics obscure a clear connection between endowment size and payout policies. In the second column of Table 6 , data indicate that most large endowment funds have very stable distribution policies, with mean and median distribution ratios of 4.61% and 4.43%, respectively, and more than 98% of all funds making a distribution in a given year. 8 In the right column of Table 6 , the data indicate that the majority of tiny endowment funds make no distribution at all, but the mean distribution is higher than for large funds, at 6.42%. The other two size cohorts see the data trend monotonically between these two extremes.
The data suggest a number of high-level conclusions about the distribution policies of endowments. First, smaller endowments appear to follow an accumulation strategy, with a predisposition to make no distributions at all to their parent organizations and instead attempt to grow to a critical mass. However, the larger mean size of their distributions -especially with the high number of zero values -implies that these endowments are more vulnerable to large, extraordinary withdrawals to cover deficits or capital projects. Once endowments grown large, they follow very different distribution strategies. The mean and median distribution rates are almost identical, in the neighborhood of 4.5%. Extraordinary distributions from larger endowments seem to be rare, since the mean and median withdrawal rates are almost equal, and virtually all large funds make at least some distribution.
The 4.5% distribution rate appears to be a focal point that is commonly used by many large, established funds. This figure approximates the real return that one might expect from a fund invested 60% in equities and 40% in risk-free debt, but if inflation is greater than zero, the 4.5% nominal distribution rate is likely to be less than the return of a typical fund, meaning that endowments will tend to grow over time. 9 This conservative distribution policy has been the focus of much of the external criticism that has focused especially on the growth of elite universities' endowments and contributed to Congress's decision to enact a 1.4% tax on large university endowment profits beginning in 2018. By comparison, private foundations are generally required to distribute at least 5.0% of their assets in order to maintain their non-profit status, and that number also has drawn criticism for being below the likely investment returns for funds held in these entities. Table 7 presents a regression analysis of annual endowment distributions as a function of six potential sources of cash for the organization: operating income, cash on the balance sheet at the start of the year, new donations, new government grants, an increase in debt, and investment earnings on the endowment itself. As above, standard errors are clustered at the organization level, and we show estimates for the overall sample and for each of the four size cohorts.
In the left column of Table 7 , estimates indicate that the dollar value of endowment distributions exhibits positive associations with two variables: operating deficits and endowments earnings. Results for the four size-based subsamples shows that the entire effect can be attributed to the payout behavior of very large endowments. Medium, small, and tiny sized endowments generally see no associations between the amounts they pay to their parents and any of the six potential alternative sources for cash.
The point estimates in the second column of Table 7 show that when endowments run operating deficits, about 17 percent of the deficit is covered by increased distributions from the endowment, a result quite close to Yermack's (2017) estimate of 13 percent for a much smaller sample of prominent art museums. This result seems to contradict Brown et. al's finding that endowment payouts are reduced when an organization experiences negative financial shocks.
However, that paper takes a different empirical approach, defining a "shock" not in terms of operating losses, but instead as a deterioration in the ratio of endowment assets over total expenses.
The other strong result in the second column of Table 7 shows that when an endowment's earnings rise or fall, the annual payout from the endowment to its parent can be expected to rise or fall by about 80% of the change in endowment earnings. This surprisingly high partial correlation is probably an artifact of some institutions following a primitive distribution policy of simply distributing all of the annual realized income of the fund to the parent (Hansmann, 1990) .
V. Endowment performance and its impact on fundraising
Given the high public interest in the investment performance of endowment funds, a natural hypothesis to examine is whether donors respond to successful years in which funds earn positive alphas. We test this hypothesis in regressions analysis shown in Table 8 is then ln(donationst / donationst-1), and we regress this against the residual for the prior year from the four-factor abnormal return model, with the intercept constrained to equal zero. Table 8 
Results in
VI. Discussion and conclusions
We study the investment returns and distribution policies of non-profit endowment funds, which have grown into a $0.5 trillion institutional investor class in the U.S. economy. Up to now, nearly all research on endowments has focused on a small, self-selected sample of large research universities, using self-reported survey data from these organizations. Although higher education endowments represent somewhat more than half of the total asset class, our results suggest that the research focus on them may be somewhat misleading, as they have inferior investment performance on an absolute basis and also when compared to endowments with parent organizations in other sectors.
In a sample of more than 24,000 endowment funds drawn from Internal Revenue Service filings, our regression analysis indicates that on average, endowment funds match their market benchmarks, but that this pattern is heavily influenced by an endowment's size. Larger endowments tend to underperform significantly, while tiny endowments earn better investment returns than expected. Endowments' returns also appear to be connected to the quality of investment advice they receive, since organizations close to cities that are major financial centers earn significantly higher investment returns.
Most endowments appear to follow distribution policies that are quite conservative, with a median payout ratio below 2.5% of their assets. Again, size plays a big role, as most tiny endowments make no distributions at all, and larger endowments tend to cluster around a distribution rate of about 4.5%. This number would appear to resemble the expected long-run real return on a fund that is invested 60% in equities and 40% in debt. Table 7 Distributions by endowments as a function of other sources of cash The table shows least squares regression estimates of the amounts of cash distributed from nonprofit endowments, as a function of six potential sources of cash for the organization. The operating surplus equals program service revenue minus program service expenses. New debt issued equals the year-over-year difference in bonds, loans, and notes outstanding. Government grants received equal cash from newly awarded grants minus changes in grants receivable. Cash on balance sheet is recorded at the start of the year. Data is based on non-profit organizations' Form 990 filings with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Standard errors clustered at the organization level appear in parentheses. 
